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RESEARCH BRIEF 
 
Temporal Sequencing, Incident Sophistication, and Terrorist Outcomes 
 
OVERVIEW  
 
There have been few efforts to examine how the planning process affects the outcome of a terrorist plot. This research brief 
provides some preliminary findings from an examination of the impact of the length of the planning process, the impact of 
multiple participants, and the volume of precursor activity on the success or failure of terrorist plots in the United States.  
 
While conventional wisdom holds true that a shorter planning process and fewer preparatory activities reduces perpetrators 
chances of getting caught therefore increases success rate, the new findings show that the more people involved in the 
planning process also increases the probability of success.  
 
DATA 
 
Data from the American Terrorism Study were used for this analysis. Analysis was conducted on 504 terrorism plots in the 
United States from 1980-2015. Data included measurements on the following variables: 
 Success – Each plot was evaluated to determine whether it was successfully carried out, partially successful, or was foiled 
or failed. For this analysis, “successful” and “partially successful” plots were compared to those that were foiled or failed. 
Incidents were coded as “unsuccessful” when activity on the intended target was prevented or failed to occur due to plot 
cancellation, complete device failure, or human intervention. 
 Number of participants – measured as the total number of participants involved in the terrorism plot. This number includes 
not only those indicted for committing the terrorist act, but also those involved in any planning or preparatory act associated 
with the plot. Unindicted co-conspirators are included in this measure. 
 Number of preparatory acts – measured as the total number of known activities related to the planning or preparation of 
the planned incident (e.g., meetings, purchase or theft of weapons, etc.). Only confirmed preparatory activities were 
counted; other “antecedent” activities (such as meetings in 
which the specific plot was not discussed) were excluded. 
 Length of the planning process – was determined by measuring 
the number of days from the first identified “preparatory” 
activity to the date of the planned incident. 
 
Data for the analysis included information from: 
o 132 far-right terrorism plots 
o 84 far-left plots 
o 75 Islamist extremist plots, and 
o 126 environmental extremist plots.  
 
The remaining plots include activities by a variety of other 
nationalist/separatist groups as well as some single-issue plots, all 
of which occurred in the United States. 
 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 
 
Detailed below, a summary of our significant conclusions, are: 
 
 Terrorists who engage in a significantly shorter planning and preparation cycle have the greatest probability of success. 
 
 The greater the number of preparatory acts required for commission of a terrorist incident, the greater the probability of 
failure. 
 
 Contrary to most expectations, the fewer the number of persons involved in the preparation process, the lower the rate 
of success. 
 
 
Extremist Plot Type
Far-right
Far-left
Islamist
Environmental
Other
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LENGTH OF THE PLANNING AND PREPARATION PROCESS 
 
Length of the planning process is the most difficult variable to measure, requiring time-stamped data for both the first planning 
activity and the date of the planned incident. Consequently, analysis could only be conducted on 262 (51.9%) of the incidents 
using this variable. Of these, nearly two-thirds (64.9%) of the plots were partially or completely successful, while slightly over 
one-third (35.1%) were unsuccessful. 
 
Table 1: Incident Success by Length of the Planning Process 
Number of Days Unsuccessful Partially/Fully Successful Row Totals 
0-21 Days 
16.7% 
(n=10) 
83.3% 
(n=50) 
22.9% 
(n=60) 
22-90 Days 
34.0% 
(n=16) 
66.0% 
(n=31) 
17.9% 
(n=47) 
91-120 Days 
62.5% 
(n=10) 
37.5% 
(n=6) 
6.1% 
(n=16) 
Over 120 Days 
40.3% 
(n=56) 
59.7% 
(n=83) 
53.1% 
(n=139) 
Total 
35.1% 
92 
64.9% 
170 
100% 
262 
X2 = 15.88, df = 3, p < 001. 
 
As Table 1 reveals, terrorists who engaged in the shortest planning cycle had the highest rates of success. Plots where known 
preparatory behaviors were limited to the three-week period prior to the incident were very likely to be successfully completed 
(83.3%).  
 
This success rate steadily declined for group or individuals who engaged in preparatory behaviors up to three or four months 
prior to the planned incident (with success rates of 66% and 37.5%, respectively). However, success rates climbed after this 
point, rising to nearly 60 percent for terrorists who engaged in planning activities longer than four months. 
 
NUMBER OF PREPARATORY BEHAVIORS AND SUCCESS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS 
 
If there are fewer precursor behaviors for law enforcement officials to observe, it seems reasonable to assume that terrorists 
would have a greater chance to successfully complete the planned incident. Our results reveal that to be an accurate 
assessment. Our measurements represent a conservative count of the volume of precursor, preparatory behavior by terrorists in 
these incidents. However, they do accurately represent the precursor conduct known to law enforcement and prosecutorial 
agencies as a result of the investigative process. Most of these behaviors are either listed as counts against the defendants or 
as overt acts of the conspiracy in the indictment. The number of preparatory acts was determined on 342 of the 504 incidents 
examined. 
 
Table 2: Incident Success by Number of Preparatory Acts 
Number of Known 
Preparatory Acts 
Unsuccessful Partially/Fully Successful Row Totals 
0 - 2 
32.0% 
(n=47) 
68.0% 
(n=100) 
43.0% 
(n=147) 
3 -5 
39.1% 
(n=25) 
60.9% 
(n=39) 
18.7% 
(n=64) 
6 -10 
46.0% 
(n=23) 
54.0% 
(n=27) 
14.6% 
(n=50) 
More than 10 
76.5% 
(n=62) 
23.5% 
(n=19) 
23.7% 
(n=81) 
Total 
45.9% 
157 
54.1% 
185 
100% 
342 
X2 = 43.32, df = 3, p < 001. 
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The findings in Table 2 are consistent with our expectations. The more preparatory activities the terrorists engaged in prior to an 
incident, the greater the probability of failure. Success rates consistently declined the more preparatory activities were required 
to carry out the incident. Incidents with two or fewer known preparatory activities were successful 68 percent of the time, 
compared to a 23.5 percent success rate if the group or individual engaged in more than 10 preparatory acts. If one can 
assume that the more sophisticated a planned incident is, the more preparatory acts are required to carry it out successfully. If 
this is correct, these findings suggest, fortunately, that while simple, smaller acts of terrorism are more likely to go undetected, 
more sophisticated planned terrorism incidents are more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement and eventually be 
thwarted. Although more research on this subject is warranted, these findings perhaps also indicate why many terrorists are 
trending toward simpler attacks against softer targets.  
 
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS AND INCIDENT SUCCESS 
 
Many different types of terrorist groups have adopted an “uncoordinated violence” strategy in the past 20 years - from the 
“leaderless resistance” model advocated by the extreme right to the “self-radicalization” of Islamist militants by ISIS. Although 
law enforcement agencies have decried the advent of the “lone actor” or “lone wolf” strategy as a means to avoid detection, it 
has not been clear whether the phenomenon is really as effective as it has been purported to be. We previously reported that 
“lone actors” had a significantly lower success rate than did members of groups or cells. In the current analysis, we use a 
different method of measuring participation. For this brief, we counted the number of persons who were not only involved in the 
commission of the actual terrorism incident, but also those who were involved in any participatory conduct. Data were coded on 
475 of the 504 incidents in the sample.  
 
Table 3: Incident Success by Number of Participants 
Number of Participants Unsuccessful Partially/Fully Successful Row Totals 
One 49.8% 
(n=102) 
50.2% 
(n=103) 
43.2% 
(n=205) 
Two or Three 39.4% 
(n=52) 
60.6% 
(n=80) 
27.8% 
(n=132) 
Four or More 26.8% 
(n=37) 
73.2% 
(n=101) 
29.1% 
(n=138) 
Total 40.2% 
191 
59.8% 
284 
100% 
475 
X2 = 18.11, df = 2, p < 001. 
 
Overall, 43 percent of the terrorist incidents were carried out by lone actors. Although not shown here, the percentage of 
incidents carried out alone has been increasing since the mid-1990s. However, the strategy does not appear to be as 
successful as it has been reported. Consistent with our early comparison between “lone actors” and “cells/groups,” the current 
analysis reveals a consistent finding that success rates increase with the addition of more participants. While there may be a 
threshold where additional members become a detriment to success, it is clear that terrorists who had help in preparing for an 
incident have greater success than those who “go it alone.” Although the dynamics of this finding needs further study, it may be 
that this is related to the number of preparatory acts necessary to carry out a successful terrorist attack. If the number of 
preparatory behaviors for an attack is relatively constant regardless of the number of members, having fewer participants 
requires that “lone wolves” commit all of these preparatory acts by themselves. Multiple participants allows these preparatory 
acts to be committed by several persons, thereby diluting the possibility that the precursor conduct would come to the attention 
of law enforcement. Although this is largely conjecture, it provides the most logical explanation for this controversial finding. 
 
ABOUT THE AMERICAN TERRORISM STUDY 
 
The American Terrorism Study (ATS) is led by researchers at the Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas. The 
ATS is an empirical relational database consisting of data on federal terrorism-related court cases, persons indicted in these 
court cases, and related officially designated terrorism incidents. Included in the TEVUS portal are data from court case, person, 
organization, affiliation, incident, and precursor activity (antecedent) tables in the ATS. Variables included cover demographic 
information, terrorist group to which the individual belongs, and temporal and geospatial data on incidents and antecedent 
activities. 
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